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This article questions whether the dominant policy discourse, 
in which a normative model of standard employment is coun-
terposed to ‘non- standard’ or ‘atypical’ employment, enables 
us to capture the diversity of fluid labour markets in which 
work is dynamically reshaped in an interaction between 
 different kinds of employment status and work organisation. 
Drawing on surveys in the UK, Germany, Sweden and the Neth-
erlands that investigate work managed via online platforms 
(‘crowdwork’) and associated practices, it demonstrates that 
crowdwork represents part of a continuum. Not only do most 
crowd workers combine work for online platforms with other 
forms of work or income generation, but also many of the ICT- 
related practices associated with crowdwork are widespread 
across the rest of the labour market where a growing number of 
workers are ‘logged’. Future research should not just focus on 
crowdworkers as a special case but on new patterns of work 
organisation in the regular workforce.
Keywords: platform labour, crowd work, standard employ-
ment model, survey, online labour, varieties of capitalism, just-
in-time labour, work organisation.
Introduction
The emergence of work managed by online platforms (sometimes known as ‘crowd-
work’ or the ‘gig economy’) has often been viewed as representing a new form of 
‘atypical’ or ‘non- standard’ employment. This article argues that it does not so much 
constitute a separately identifiable form of work but an extreme example of a much 
broader series of trends that are also affecting forms of work and employment gener-
ally regarded as ‘regular’, ‘typical’ or ‘standard’. It asks, in other words, whether the 
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normative model that has been used as a benchmark in Western Europe since the end 
of World War II has now lost its validity.
In the first two decades of the 21st century, there has been a dissolution of many of 
the characteristic features of work as it was normatively conceived in the second half 
of the 20th century. Several socio- economic and technological trends have converged 
to bring about a breakdown of clear spatial boundaries between work and leisure, a 
disintegration of fixed occupational identities and a dispersal of work, both spatially 
and contractually, along extended global value chains. Despite the increasing number 
of deviations from the standard model of work laid down in most developed Western 
economies in the mid- 20th century, this model is still generally referred to as the norm, 
with other forms of work treated, both by policymakers and by academics, as ‘atypical’ 
or ‘non- standard’. One such form of ‘atypical’ work that has become the focus of atten-
tion in the 2010s is work managed via online platforms (referred to in this article as 
‘crowdwork’). This is a form of work that does not fit easily into existing classification 
systems of workers—by occupation, by sector, by place of work or by type of 
contract—and is therefore exceptionally difficult to measure.
This article draws on a series of population surveys carried out in four European 
countries designed to identify crowdworkers. It argues that, although it represents an 
extreme example of precarious work, crowdwork cannot usefully be defined as ‘atyp-
ical’ or ‘non- standard’. On the contrary, many of the features associated with it are 
becoming increasingly prevalent in many occupations across the labour market, bring-
ing the normative conventional model of work and employment itself into question.
We begin by summarising the conceptual approaches that have been taken in the 
past to explaining variations in the standard employment model, including precari-
ousness. We then briefly review the existing research on crowdwork before presenting 
the preliminary results of four online surveys, conducted in the UK, Germany, 
Netherlands and Sweden, co- funded by the Foundation for European Progressive 
Studies (FEPS) and the trade union confederation UNI Europa, which, for the first 
time, provided evidence of the extent and characteristics of crowdwork practices. We 
end by drawing some conclusions from these results and reflecting on their implica-
tions for the notion of a standard model of work and employment in the context of 
digitalised globalised 21st century labour markets.
The European normative model of work and its varieties
The normative model of work that developed in Europe, and to some extent in other 
developed Western economies, after World War II has been analysed in a number of 
ways by scholars coming from a range of different theoretical perspectives. The period 
in which it developed has been conceived, variously, as the ‘post- war Keynesian wel-
fare state’ (Jessop, 1990), ‘the Golden Age of Capitalism’ (Marglin and Schor, 1992), 
‘Les Trente glorieuses’ (Fourastie, 1979) or ‘Fordism’ a concept which, in the French 
Regulation school approach (Aglietta, 1976; Lipietz and Macey, 1987), denotes a he-
gemonic mode of production/accumulation, linked to a particular historical period, 
rather than a specific form of work organisation.
For empirical researchers, the concept of a normative model of work raises two puz-
zles. The first is how to explain variations in the form it has taken in different national 
contexts. This has often been addressed by arguing that there are different ‘worlds of 
welfare capitalism’ (Esping- Andersen, 1990) or ‘varieties of capitalism’ (Coates, 2000; 
Hall and Soskice, 2001), with employment models, along with other economic features, 
being shaped by an interplay between international capitalism on the one hand and 
specific institutions on the other, in an approach often associated with Institutional 
Economics (Hodgson, 1988). The second conundrum facing researchers has been how 
to explain the observable empirical reality that the model of full- time permanent em-
ployment is far from universal, even in the countries with the most inclusive and egal-
itarian welfare regimes and social- democratic varieties of capitalism. This was 
theorised by Doeringer and Piore (1971) as a binary division between ‘internal’ or 
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‘primary’ and ‘external’ or ‘secondary’ labour markets, using the concept of’dual la-
bour markets’, a concept that was subsequently replaced by some researchers (in the 
recognition that multiple models of employment could co- exist in the same economy) 
by that of ‘labour market segmentation’ (Burchell and Rubery, 1990; Wilkinson and 
Rubery, 1994). Another, related, approach has been to view the labour market in terms 
of a ‘core’ of secure workers with permanent jobs, surrounded by a ‘periphery’ of 
workers who can be called on as required by ‘flexible organisations’ to meet fluctua-
tions in demand (Atkinson, 1984; Atkinson and Meager, 1986).
For policy- makers, workers who do not fit the standard employment model have 
generally been defined as exceptions to this norm: as being in ‘non- standard’ or ‘atyp-
ical’ employment (see for instance, OECD, 2015; Cazes & Nesporova for the ILO, 2003; 
Broughton, Biletta & Kullander for Eurofound, 2010), with statistics most likely to be 
collected for part- time workers and workers on fixed- term contracts, seen as the two 
most common forms of atypicality. These terms, which reinforce the idea of a norm, 
but duck the question of how exceptions to it are created, have been adopted by many 
labour market researchers, albeit in the recognition that ‘atypical’ work takes many 
different forms, creating problems of definition and cross- country comparison (see, for 
instance, de Grip et al., 1997; Duell, 2004; Keller and Seifert, 2005). Further analysis, 
especially in the fields of labour sociology and gender studies, has shown that patterns 
of exclusion from the primary labour market of ‘normal’ employment are strongly 
gendered and racialised (Smith and Rubery, 1998; Perrons, 2000; Vosko, 2000) and can 
thus not be explained without reference to broader social structures, external to the 
labour market per se. The literature on homeworking (Huws, 1984; Huws and Bisset, 
1984; Huws et al., 1990; Phizacklea and Wolowitz, 1995; Felstead et al., 2005) supplies 
evidence of the complexity of these interactions.
Scholarly attempts to explain the progressive weakening of the standard employ-
ment model since (at least) the 1990s, have primarily come from two directions.
The first of these draws from sources both in mainstream organisational studies (e.g. 
Porter, 1990; Dunning, 1993) and in World Systems theory (e.g. Wallerstein, 1979; 
Arrighi et al., 1999) analysing corporate restructuring as a driver of changes in the or-
ganisation and character of employment, often paying particular attention to value 
chain restructuring (Gereffi et al., 2005; Flecker and Meil, 2010). Combined with in-
sights from labour sociology, in particular the labour process theory tradition 
(Braverman, 1974; Thompson, 2009), this strand has given rise to a rich seam of studies 
that anatomise the ways in which organisational restructuring has been accompanied 
by the fragmentation and outsourcing of business functions and tasks, the blurring of 
organisational boundaries, the devolution of formal responsibility for employment 
(but not ultimate managerial control) and the development of new employment mod-
els (see for example Grimshaw et al., 2002; Marchington et al., 2006; Muehlberger, 2007; 
Flecker, 2009).
The second strand draws in particular on the concept of ‘Post- Fordism’ developed 
within French Regulation School theory (Amin, 1994; Jessop, 1995; Lipietz, 1997) and 
on Italian Workerist (Wright, 2002) and Autonomist (Lazzarato, 1996; Hardt and Negri, 
2004; Morini and Fumagalli, 2010; Fumagalli, 2015) theory. This approach tends to fo-
cus on precariousness as a generalised feature of a particular phase of capitalist devel-
opment, even to the notion of a ‘precariat’ (Standing, 2011) as a new class, rather than 
the more specific focus on the casualisation of designated groups of workers in par-
ticular positions in organisations and their value chains that has characterised much of 
the scholarship in the first approach.
Recently, there has been something of a convergence between these two approaches, 
thanks in part to a growing body of empirical research on precarious creative and 
knowledge workers among scholars working in the field of communications and cul-
tural studies (see for example, Ross, 2009; Gill & Pratt, 2008). A new field of precarious 
work studies appears to be emerging, drawing to varying degrees from both these 
traditions, with empirical work focusing on workers across a wide spectrum of sectors 
and occupations, for example new media workers (Gill, 2010), academic researchers 
(Norkus et al., 2016), domestic workers (Pernigotti, 2012), call centre workers (Brophy, 
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2011), radio producers (Bonini and Gandini, 2016) and medical staff (Palukka and 
Tiilikka, 2011).
In most of this literature precarious work is still counterposed to a normative model 
of ‘standard’, ‘typical’ or ‘decent’1 work, leaving the dominant paradigm more or less 
intact, though increasingly problematic. Nevertheless, this expanding body of evi-
dence cumulatively paints a picture of highly diverse labour markets across Europe 
(and indeed elsewhere around the globe), a heterogeneity that cannot easily be cap-
tured in the labour market statistics that, perforce, have to assign people to the binary 
categories of ‘full time’ or ‘part time’, ‘permanent’ or ‘temporary’, ‘employed’ or ‘self- 
employed’, ‘in work’ or ‘seeking work’, although these simple statistics do neverthe-
less provide valuable evidence of trends.
This is the context in which ‘crowd employment’ has begun to attract the attention 
of scholars and policy makers as a ‘new form of employment’ (Eurofound, 2015). The 
next section of this article discusses the existing research literature on this phenome-
non, which we term ‘crowdwork’ for the purposes of this article, by which we mean 
paid work organised by online platforms acting as intermediaries between workers 
and their employers or clients (see Huws, 2015, 2016a,b; Huws, 2017; Huws et al., 2017).
Crowdwork
The emergence of online platforms for managing work in the early 21st century took many 
labour market researchers by surprise. Like that of other technologically enabled develop-
ments in the organisation of labour (such as teleworking, or offshore outsourcing), it was 
heralded by a confusing terminological flurry, deriving from several different conceptual 
frameworks, not all of which were related to the market for paid labour.
Some of these terms, such as ‘peer production’ (Bauwens, 2006) and ‘collaborative 
consumption’ (Botsman and Rogers, 2010) refer to notions of a ‘sharing economy’ 
(Benkler, 2004; Horton and Zeckhauser, 2016) in which online platforms are conceived 
simply as intermediaries between individuals wanting to share goods and services, not 
necessarily for reimbursement. Related to such terms are others that focus particularly 
on the blurring of boundaries between production and consumption, such as ‘pro-
sumption’ (Toffler, 1980; Ritzer and Jurgenson, 2010) ‘co- creation’ (Prahalad and 
Ramaswamy, 2000; Banks and Humphreys, 2008) and ‘playbour’ (Kücklich, 2005).
A third strand in the discourse, including the terms ‘cloudsourcing’ (Vaquero et al., 
2008; Muhic and Johansson, 2014) and ‘crowdsourcing’ (Howe and Robinson, 2005) 
draws on the notion of a ‘human cloud’ (Kaganer et al., 2012) or ‘crowd’ (Surowiecki, 
2005) whose brains can be picked or labour accessed via online intermediaries, whether 
this is carried out paid, unpaid or with the possibility of payment in the event of win-
ning a competition. As indicated by the suffix ‘sourcing’, this terminology presents 
‘crowdwork’ (Kittur et al., 2013) as an evolution from earlier outsourcing or global 
sourcing practices which enable employers to select from a large pool of talent without 
entering into any long- term relationship of mutual commitment.
This employers’ perspective becomes even more obvious in terms such as ‘workforce as 
a service’ (OnForce, 2013), ‘workforce on demand’ (Deloitte, 2015) ‘just- in- time workforce’ 
(De Stefano, 2016) or ‘liquid workforce’ (Accenture, 2016). On the labour supply side, a 
vocabulary is often used that relates back to more traditional forms of self- employment, 
such as ‘gig economy’ (Grossman and Woyke, 2015) a term that suggests that it is not only 
normal but also fun to hop creatively from job to job on an ad hoc basis.
Mostly lacking clear definitions, these, and many other similar terms, refer to re-
lated, but not necessarily identical, concepts, highlighting various features of the new, 
rapidly evolving forms of online management which are shaping and reshaping more 
and more aspects of contemporary labour. Much of the literature on the development 
of online platforms is, implicitly at least, technologically deterministic, treating it as a 
new and unprecedented phenomenon originating in Silicon Valley in the first decade 
of the 21st century when most of the best- known platforms were launched (Elance was 
founded in 1999, oDesk in 2003, Amazon Mechanical Turk in 2005, Taskrabbit in 2008 
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and Uber in 2009) as a direct result of technological innovation. Few attempts have 
been made to integrate it into broader conceptual frameworks for analysing labour 
markets, perhaps because the lack of clear definitions translates into a lack of indica-
tors and hence an absence of statistics that can demonstrate the numbers, characteris-
tics and geographical, occupational and sectoral distribution of this portion of the 
workforce. Partial exceptions to this include Bergvall- Kåreborn and Howcroft (2014).
Nevertheless, there have been attempts to develop definitions and typologies of 
crowdwork (see for example Green et al., 2014; Brinkley, 2016; Durward et al., 2016; 
Eurofound, 2015; Mandl, 2016; Estellés- Arolas and González- Ladrón- de- Guevara, 
20122 ) as well as to establish what their legal employment status might be (Stone, 2006; 
Felstiner, 2011; Dokko et al., 2015; Katz, 2015; De Stefano, 2016).
There has also been empirical research on the characteristics of crowdworkers in-
cluding surveys based on particular platforms (Ipeirotis, 2010a,b; Ross et al., 2010; 
Irani, 2015; Berg, 2016), case studies (Green et al., 2013), in- depth interviews (Caraway, 
2010; D’Cruz and Noronha, 2016), secondary analysis of platform data (Gandini et al., 
2016) and action research carried out with the active participation of crowdworkers 
(LaPlante and Silberman, 2016; Milland, 2016). There have also been some attempts in 
the United States to measure the scale of participation in the online economy across 
whole populations. (Katz and Kreuger, 2016; Steinmetz, 2016).
What most of these exercises have in common is a presumption that crowdwork is a 
distinctive type of work, capable of being distinguished precisely from other kinds of 
work and, moreover, with its own stable sub- categories, with little or no attention to 
commonalities with those other kinds of work.
Our survey was designed in part to fill an empirical gap on the extent and character-
istics of crowdwork in Europe. However by conceiving crowdwork as a constructed 
variable (i.e. using a definition based on a combination of different variables each of 
which can be analysed separately) it also aimed to analyse differences and commonal-
ities among crowdworkers and non- crowdworkers across the whole labour market.
Survey design and methodology
Drawing on an extensive review of the existing literature (Huws, 2015; Huws, 2017) 
and with funding from the Foundation for European Progressive Studies and UNI 
Europa,3 online surveys were carried out of 8,690 adults in the UK, Sweden, Germany 
and the Netherlands between 22 January and 27 April 2016. The surveys were subse-
quently carried out in other European countries but we focus here on these four which 
were carried out in the first research period and illustrate a variety of different welfare 
regime types. The surveys were conducted by Ipsos MORI as add- ons to its regular 
national omnibus surveys, following recommended practice in research on the infor-
mal economy (Williams & Schnieder, 2016). All samples were stratified by age, gender, 
region and working status to be representative of the total adult working- age4 popula-
tion. The results were then weighted to take account of known differences between 
online and offline populations in each country.
Given the lack of commonly recognised definitions and terminology, the approach 
that was adopted was to capture information about a wide range of practices with 
which crowdwork might be confused in other statistics, including other forms of on-
line income generation and online job search. Crowdworkers could then be isolated 
from the broader sample by elimination. It was also possible to investigate several 
definitions of crowdwork by combining these variables in different ways. Questions 
were also asked about a range of other practices linked with online management, 
whether associated with crowdwork or more conventional forms of employment. The 
main empirical results of the survey have been published elsewhere (Huws et al., 2017) 
and it is not our intention to repeat them here. Rather our objective is to explore over-
laps between crowdworkers and other workers, and investigate similarities in the 
ways that their work is organised and managed.
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The analyses of the data are intended to be descriptive in nature, with a view to uncov-
ering the story of how sections of the population are engaged with crowdwork and its as-
sociated practices. However, the deceptively simple nature of the analyses was only made 
possible by the careful nature of the data collection and the weighting strategies used. 
Rather than adopt a complex modelling approach to account for biases within a sample, 
Figure 1: Participation in the online economy as a source of income, by country  
Source: Hertfordshire Business School Crowd Work Survey, 2016. 
Base: 2,238 respondents in the UK, 2,146 respondents in Sweden, 2,180 Respondents 
in Germany and 2,126 respondents in the Netherlands (weighted).
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attention was paid to obtaining a well- balanced raw sample and the calculation of weights 
which could lead to population estimates being produced with minimum bias.5
Research findings
Embeddedness of crowdwork in other income- generating activities
The research revealed crowdwork as a practice that is difficult to distinguish from 
other income- generating activities. On the one hand, it is associated with other ways of 
earning an income online which do not involve the sale of labour; on the other hand, it 
is combined with other sources of earnings from work.
Figure 2: Earnings from crowdwork as a proportion of all income, all crowdworkers, by coun-
try with ‘don’t know’ and ‘prefer not to say’ responses omitted (%)  
Source: Hertfordshire Business School Crowd Work Survey, 2016. 
Base: 181 respondents in the UK, 163 respondents in Sweden, 223 Respondents in Ger-
many and 141 respondents in the Netherlands stating that they had ever carried out 
crowdwork (weighted).
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As Figure 1 shows, a large proportion of the population—over half the sample once 
a small number of ‘don’t know’ responses have been excluded—in each of the four 
countries surveyed used online platforms to generate an income in 2016, especially by 
selling and reselling goods online (on large generic platforms such as eBay or Amazon 
or on their own dedicated websites). A significant minority (between 8% and 11%) also 
used platforms like Airbnb to generate an income from renting out accommodation to 
paying guests. In this broader context, the proportion (ranging from 9% to 12% de-
pending on country) who claimed to have at some point made an income by selling 
their labour online (crowdwork) is relatively modest.
For most, this was an occasional activity. Narrowing the focus down to those re-
spondents who said they sold their labour via online platforms at least monthly pro-
duced a smaller group, representing 6%–8% of the sample, which fell further to 5%–6% 
when the focus was restricted to those who said they did crowdwork at least weekly. 
This group can be regarded as ‘frequent crowdworkers’. For the majority of crowd-
workers, income from this work was a supplement to other earnings, as Figure 2 
shows. Nevertheless, for a small minority (between 3% and 11% when omitting those 
who responded ‘don’t know’ or ‘prefer not to say’) it represented their only income, 
with a further 7%–12% for whom it constituted between 75% and 99% of total earnings. 
It constituted more than half of personal income for only 25% of crowdworkers in the 
Netherlands and in Germany, 36% in Sweden and 34% in the UK.
It is clear, therefore, that selling one’s labour via an online platform is part of a contin-
uum of practices, including other forms of income generation via the Internet on the one 
Figure 3: Sending or receiving email and instant messaging from home, by country: compar-
ison of frequent crowdworkers, all crowdworkers and non- crowdworkers with ‘don’t know’ 
responses omitted (%)  
Source: Hertfordshire Business School Crowd Work Survey, 2016. 
Base: 2,180 respondents in the UK, 2,060 respondents in Sweden, 2,087 Respondents in Ger-
many and 2,071 respondents in the Netherlands (weighted).
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hand and employment which is not obtained via online platforms on the other. Depending 
on where they are placed on this spectrum, many workers may be able, to some extent, to 
rely on the protections offered by standard employment contracts in their other part- time 
or full- time employment. But for a significant minority of the adult population (about one 
person in 40 across the whole sample), crowdwork provides the main source of income, 
suggesting a high degree of dependency on platforms and, with it, relative exclusion from 
these conventional forms of protection. While not wishing to minimise the social costs to 
these workers, the more important point here is that they are a minority and the experience 
of crowdwork is spread much more broadly across the working population.
The picture that emerges is one in which growing proportions of the population, 
including many people in ‘regular’ employment, are piecing together a livelihood 
from multiple sources of income, not all of which involve the sale of their labour. 
Where people are selling their labour, online platforms represent only one of several 
different sources of paid work.
Commonalities between crowdworkers and non- crowdworkers in terms of work 
organisation
We have already demonstrated that many workers who are in regular employment are 
also engaging in work managed via online platforms. We now turn to the question of 
Figure 4: Use of ‘app’ to log work and notification of available work, by country: compari-
son of frequent crowdworkers, all crowdworkers and non- crowdworkers with ‘don’t know’ 
responses omitted (%)  
Source: Hertfordshire Business School Crowd Work Survey, 2016. 
Base: 2,163 respondents in the UK, 2,025 respondents in Sweden, 2,086 Respondents in Ger-
many and 2,057 respondents in the Netherlands (weighted).
8%
10%
15%
9%
62%
53%
63%
57%
74%
61%
69%
71%
8%
15%
24%
14%
63%
60%
70%
63%
75%
69%
74%
75%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80%
Germany
The Netherlands
Sweden
UK
Germany
The Netherlands
Sweden
UK
Germany
The Netherlands
Sweden
UK
N
on
-c
ro
w
d 
w
or
ke
rs
Cr
ow
d 
w
or
ke
r
Fr
eq
ue
nt
 cr
ow
d 
w
or
ke
rs
App for logging App for loficaon
122  New Technology, Work and Employment © 2018 The Authors 
New Technology, Work and Employment 
published by Brian Towers (BRITOW) and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
the extent to which the forms of work organisation found in crowdwork represent 
broader patterns, also found in other types of employment.
We focus here on three groups of ICT- related practices which enable crowdwork: 
the use of email or SMS communication from the home; the use of an ‘app’ provided 
by the employer or client to notify workers when work is available; and the use of 
specialised ‘apps’ or websites for logging work (e.g. to report the worker’s location, 
record the start and finishing times of jobs or record the hours worked).
Figures 3–5 compare the use of these practices among frequent (at least weekly) 
crowdworkers, occasional crowdworkers and non- crowdworkers in the four countries 
studied.
As expected, sending or receiving work- related emails and texts while at home, 
shown in Figure 3, is a very common practice among crowdworkers. Work- related 
email use was reported by between 87% (in the Netherlands and Germany) and 94% 
(in Sweden) among frequent (at least weekly) crowdworkers, and between 82% (in 
Germany) and 87% (in Sweden) of all crowdworkers. The picture for work- related text 
and instant messaging was similar, ranging between 85% (n the Netherlands) and 91% 
(in Sweden) among frequent crowdworkers, and between 79% (in Germany) and 90% 
(in Sweden) among all crowdworkers). More striking, however, is the high level of 
these practices among non- crowdworkers. Between 36% (in Germany) and 61% (in the 
Netherlands) send or receiving work- related emails whilst at home. The comparable 
levels for texts or instant messages range from 29% (in Germany) to 56% (in Sweden). 
These are thus common practices for up to half of the non- crowd workforce, indicating 
Figure 5: Either ‘app’ use, by country: comparison of frequent crowdworkers, occasional 
crowdworkers and non- crowdworkers with ‘don’t know’ responses omitted (%) 
Source: Hertfordshire Business School Crowd Work Survey, 2016. 
Base: 2,168 respondents in the UK, 2,020 respondents in Sweden, 2,085 Respondents 
in Germany and 2,061 respondents in the Netherlands (weighted).
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a widespread breakdown of spatial and temporal boundaries between home and 
work.
We next turn to the more recent and specialised practice of using an ‘app’ on a 
smartphone or other electronic device to notify workers when work is available for 
them, often seen as a quintessential feature of ‘just- in- time’ working. Here too, as can 
be seen in Figure 4, the use of this practice rises with the intensity of crowdworking: 
between 61% and 74% of weekly crowdworkers use such apps, compared with 53%–
63% of all crowdworkers and 8%–15% of non- crowdworkers. Once again, crowdwork 
can be seen as positioned at the more intensive end of a spectrum which also includes 
non- crowdworkers. At least a quarter of frequent crowdworkers and approximately 
half of all crowdworkers do not use such apps, while a small, but significant, propor-
tion of non- crowdworkers are subjected to the same form of just- in- time discipline in 
the context of other forms of employment.
Finally, we focus on another electronic tool for the remote management of workers: 
the use of apps or platforms for logging working hours, also shown in Figure 4. This 
displays a similar picture. Around three quarters of frequent crowdworkers (ranging 
from 69% in the Netherlands to 75% in Germany and the UK) use such tools, as do 
60%–70% of all crowdworkers. Among non- crowdworkers, the proportion ranges 
from 8% in Germany to 24% in Sweden. Again, it is evident that this practice is preva-
lent right across the workforce, although found more frequently among 
crowdworkers.
In other words, the practices used in the ‘platform economy’ can be seen as extreme 
cases of much more widespread forms of work organisation. Having to be available to 
check emails or respond to text messages from home, being summoned to work at 
short notice by an ‘app’ and having to log one’s progress electronically are becoming 
increasingly prevalent features of employment right across the labour market in a 
 development that has been dubbed ‘logged labour’ (Huws, 2016b).
The ‘logged’ workforce
We now look at the characteristics of the larger iceberg of which crowdwork represents 
the tip. Across the workforce as a whole in the four countries studied, between 34% (in 
Germany) and 53% (in Sweden) of adults in work send or receive work- related email 
from their homes with similar proportions (ranging from 29% to 53%) communicating 
in this way with employers or clients by text message. This represents an estimated 16 
million people in the UK, 16 million in Germany, 5.5 million in the Netherlands and 2.8 
million in Sweden, of whom 3 million are crowdworkers in the UK, 5 million in 
Germany, 800 thousand in the Netherlands and 900 thousand in Sweden. Crowdworkers 
can thus be seen to represent a minority of this bigger teleworking workforce, which is 
very large indeed.
Narrowing the focus down to practices which are more closely associated with on-
line platforms, we looked at those workers using apps for summoning them to work or 
for logging their hours. Here, we found that across the workforce as a whole, between 
19% (in Germany) and 32% (Sweden) use apps in this fashion. This represents 7 million 
people in the UK, 7 million people in Germany, 2 million people in the Netherlands, 
and 1.5 million people in Sweden. Of these, crowdworkers account for 2.5 million peo-
ple in the UK, 4.3 million in Germany, with 630,000 crowdworking app users in the 
Netherlands and 400,000 in Sweden. Although, as would be expected, the usage of 
such apps is smaller in percentage terms across the population as a whole than among 
crowdworkers, when we look at the actual numbers of ‘regular’ workers managed by 
these apps it is clear that they considerably outnumber the app- using crowdworkers: 
for every crowdworker using such apps there are (depending on country) two or three 
other users who are not crowdworkers.
National differences cannot be understood purely as a function of the use of digital 
technology and platforms. The use of apps for notifications and logging of work and 
the use of emails and texts by employers varies from country to country. For instance, 
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Sweden has a relatively low frequency of crowdworkers, but a high frequency of app 
use and electronic communications outside of working hours. Germany has the lowest 
rate of app use, but is somewhere in the middle in terms of crowdwork frequency.
Breaking these figures down by age shows that they are most prevalent among the 
young. Even when controlling for gender, country and crowdworking status, working 
people under the age of 40 were much more likely to use apps for receiving notifica-
tions of available work and logging their work than working older respondents. (The 
odds ratio for  either app was 1.57, which means that the odds of using either type of 
app were over 50% higher for younger respondents; the odds ratio for using both apps 
weekly was 1.67, meaning the odds of young people using both apps were about two- 
thirds higher than for older respondents). There were no significant differences in 
terms of email use or instant messaging—practices which have spread across all age 
ranges. The young profile of the more specialist app users suggest that these practices 
will increase over time; with new labour market entrants be increasingly expected to 
use them while the earlier adopters age.
Conclusion
What do these results tell us about the standard employment model in Europe?
First, they caution us against drawing sharp differentiations between ‘typical’ and 
‘atypical’ types of employment, let alone a binary distinction between a ‘salariat’ and a 
‘precariat’ (Standing, 2011). Rather, these results suggest that paid work is spread 
across a variegated spectrum in which there is a complex interaction between different 
kinds of employment status and different forms of work organisation, shaping a real-
ity in which it might be more appropriate to speak of degrees of regularity and precar-
ity. Further research on the changing lineaments of these interactions between work 
organisation and contractual status could build useful on analyses of data sources like 
the European Working Conditions Survey (see, for example, the insightful analysis of 
varieties of self- employment by Vermeylen et al. (2017).
Official EU statistics suggest that the majority of employment in Europe remains 
‘standard’ (European Commission, 2017: 14) although non- standard employment is 
growing rapidly (from 23% among 25–39- year- olds in 1995 to 32% in 2016) and could 
become a majority of all employment by 2030 if present trends continue (Ibid). Our re-
sults add weight to the evidence from this and other sources that a general precarisa-
tion of employment is taking place, and growing rapidly. In 2015, the International 
Labour Organization reported ‘a global shift away from the standard employment 
model, in which workers earn wages and salaries in a dependent employment rela-
tionship vis-à-vis their employers, have stable jobs and work full time. In advanced 
economies, the standard employment model is less and less dominant’ (International 
Labour Organization, 2015:1). Even within standard employment, the proportion who 
are on part- time or temporary contracts now accounts for nearly six of 10 workers (ibid: 
1). Meanwhile, the numbers who are not on standard employment contracts continue 
to rise. In the UK, for example, those on zero- hours contracts grew by three- quarters of 
a million between 2006 and 2016 while workers on temporary contracts grew by over 
200,000 in the same period (Booth, 2016).
However, our results suggest that contractual status alone is not a reliable indicator 
and that it is necessary to probe deeper into the conditions of ‘standard workers’ to 
examine the extent to which their work is actually structured by the norms that sup-
posedly underlie their standard contracts (a fixed working week with clear spatial and 
temporal boundaries between work and non- work and clear job descriptions that 
specify when and how work is to be carried out).
Our evidence suggests that, while crowdworkers may represent an extreme exam-
ple of ‘logged labour’,6 expected to be available at any time to perform a specific task, 
their situation is by no means exceptional. Between a third and a half of non- 
crowdworkers now check their emails from their homes, suggesting a widespread 
blurring of the spatial and temporal boundaries of the working day. A smaller 
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minority (ranging from one in ten to one in 20 of the non- crowd workforce) are also 
expected to respond to apps telling them when to report for work, while between 8% 
and 24% use an app to log the work they have done. While further qualitative research 
will be required to investigate these patterns in greater depth, this suggests not only 
that ‘standard’ workers may be expected to work beyond normal hours but also that 
they are increasingly managed by performance.
Our results also make it apparent that high proportions of the labour force are sup-
plementing the wages from their main employment with income from other sources, 
of which online platforms form one among several. In the process, they are stepping 
outside the boundaries of their designated occupation, taking on a multiplicity of eco-
nomic roles that may range from petty trade to renting out property to providing per-
sonal services. Again, further qualitative research will be required to investigate the 
extent to which this is a new and growing phenomenon. However, it does cast doubt 
on the assumption underlying the standard employment model that it is the norm for 
workers to rely exclusively on their employer for their incomes. It also illustrates a 
general blurring of the boundaries that demarcate a particular ‘job’. If we take a job to 
mean an activity linked to a clear occupational identity that is carried out by employ-
ees during fixed, specified hours, normally on the employer’s premises, and providing 
all of the worker’s income, we can see that several of these defining features have been 
eroded for a substantial proportion of the population.
Finally, the conclusion that an erosion of the standard employment model is taking 
place alongside the spread of new management practices also suggests a diminution of 
the differences between distinctive national models. One of the most striking feature of 
these results is the similarity between four countries with very different welfare re-
gimes and ‘varieties of capitalism’ (with Germany regarded by Esping- Andersen 
(1990), as a classically ‘corporatist’ model, Sweden as ‘social democratic’, the UK as 
‘liberal’ and the Netherlands as a social democratic/corporatist hybrid). Whatever is 
driving these patterns of crowdworking, it seems unlikely that these drivers are struc-
turally embedded in specific national institutional frameworks.
We must conclude that the growth of crowdwork practices is related to broader in-
ternational trends that may be spreading below the radar of nationally specific regula-
tions. If this is the case, large questions are raised for national policy- makers about 
what kinds of regulation and social protection systems will be appropriate for the just- 
in- time labour markets that appear to be emerging in the 21st century.
Notes
1.  The term ‘decent work’ has been adopted by the International Labour Organization (ILO) to frame 
a broad policy agenda for improvement of employment standards (see http://www.ilo.org/
global/topics/decent-work/lang--en/index.htm). While not identical in meaning to the concept of 
‘standard employment’ it overlaps with it in many respects in practice.
2.  These—and their limitations or inadequacies—are discussed at length in Huws (2015) and Huws, 
Spencer, Syrdal & Holts (2017).
3.  Additional co- funding for national surveys was provided by TNO in the Netherlands, Unionen in 
Sweden and ver.di and IG- Metall in Germany.
4.  The main differences between the four national samples relate to the upper age ranges questioned, 
following the normal practices of national omnibus surveys in each country. In each of the four 
countries, the sample included people aged 16 and over, but in Sweden the upper cut- off point was 
65 years of age, whereas this was 70 in Germany and the Netherlands and 75 in the UK.
5.  Figures have been presented without confidence intervals because to include them on every occa-
sion would make this paper unwieldy to read. For those percentages based on the whole sample 
within a country, all confidence intervals would be within approximately ±2.2% of the figures 
quoted. For percentages based on crowdworkers alone, confidence intervals would be within 
±5.0% to 7.1% depending on the country (larger numbers of crowdworkers giving narrower 
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intervals). For percentages based on at least weekly crowdworkers alone, confidence intervals 
would be within ±5.8% to 10.0% depending on the country.
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